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Public primary and secondary education is
big business in the United States.
1 As Table 1 illus-
trates, nearly 90 percent of U.S. children attend
public schools, at an annual public expenditure
of more than 3.5 percent of gross domestic
product. In 1994 government spending on pri-
mary and secondary education exceeded $235
billion, or roughly 3.5 percent of GDP.
Public education is also big business inter-
nationally. In 1994 the governments of Ger-
many, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom
each spent at least 2.9 percent of GDP on pri-
mary and secondary schooling, while the govern-
ments of Canada and France each spent at least
4 percent of GDP. Worldwide, public spending
on primary and secondary education in 1994
topped $1.275 trillion.
The fact that societies around the world
spend so much public money on education
does not prove that government has an eco-
nomically legitimate role in primary and sec-
ondary education, however. Education’s perva-
sively public nature could also be interpreted as
evidence that special interests around the world
successfully use governments to further their
own, private objectives. One must look else-
where for economic insight into the govern-
ment’s role in primary and secondary education.
Traditionally, economists offer three broad
rationales for government participation in pri-
mary and secondary education (for example,
see the discussions in Hoxby 1996 or Poterba
1996). If any of these rationales hold, the only
open question is the nature of that participation.
This article describes the three rationales, dis-
cusses the economic evidence in their support,
and examines their implications for govern-
ment’s role in primary and secondary education.
RATIONALES FOR GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
First, many economists believe that imper-
fections in the capital market cause it to fail to
provide the socially desirable level of educa-
tional investment. For example, because human
capital is embodied in people, it is difficult to
use as collateral for a loan.
2 Therefore, if the edu-
cation market were purely private, lenders would
charge a premium for educational loans that they
would not charge for other types of investment
loans. Such a premium leads to underinvestment
in human capital from a social perspective.
Furthermore, because children, by virtue
of their youth, cannot commit to repay educa-
tional loans, they must rely on their families to
invest appropriately in their educations. Becker
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not plan to leave bequests to their children also
tend to underinvest in their education.
3 In their
view, “both parents and children could be bet-
ter off with a ‘contract’ that calls for parents to
raise investments to the efficient level in return
for a commitment by children to repay their
elderly parents” (Becker and Murphy 1988, 6). 
A system of tax-supported education coupled
with transfers to the elderly could function like
such a contract. Creating and enforcing desir-
able contracts that fail to exist in the market
could be a rationale for government participa-
tion in primary and secondary education.
4
Second, some economists argue that edu-
cation generates positive externalities—that is,
benefits to society that exceed the benefits to the
students themselves. For example, Friedman and
Friedman (1990) argue that “a stable democratic
society is impossible without a minimum degree
of literacy and knowledge on the part of most
citizens.” Because students and their families
don’t consider these benefits when they make
educational decisions—such as whether to drop
out of high school—they tend to invest less in
education than would be socially optimal. If
increased education is the most cost-effective
way to produce externality benefits, society has
an interest in encouraging people to invest in
more schooling than they otherwise would.
Finally, some economists argue that soci-
ety feels altruistic toward children—especially
poor children—and education is a tool for
redistributing some of society’s resources in
their direction. Although the recipients might
prefer cash, society gives education, either
because educational transfers are an efficient
strategy for ensuring that children—rather than
parents—are the recipients of public funds or be-
cause educational transfers satisfy society’s taste
for charity.
5 The latter reason is similar to the argu-
ment for why the government gives poor people
food stamps instead of cash: society wants the
recipients to consume what it thinks is good for
them, not necessarily what they think is good
for them.
THE EVIDENCE
No economist has found a smoking gun
that irrefutably supports any of these rationales
for government intervention in the education
market. Furthermore, because economists gen-
erally accept it, the capital-market-failure ration-
ale has been the subject of little or no empirical
research. However, a substantial body of work
suggests education may generate positive exter-
nalities, and a few researchers examining the
demand for education have found evidence that
could support either the altruism or the exter-
nality rationale.
Analyses of Externalities
Educational externalities fall into two broad
categories—second-best externalities and first-
best externalities. Second-best externalities arise
when education generates nonprivate benefits as
a consequence of an unrelated and distortionary
government policy; first-best externalities arise
independent of such policies. Because the non-
private benefits associated with second-best ex-
ternalities would not exist (or would be private
benefits) if the distortionary policy did not exist,
second-best externalities are not as persuasive
as first-best externalities for justifying govern-
ment intervention in the education market.
Second-Best Externalities. The tax code is
a major source of second-best externalities from
education. Because incomes increase with edu-
cation, income tax payments increase with edu-
cation. The increased earnings and consumption
of educated individuals also lead them to pay
more in sales, payroll, and property taxes.
Although the magnitude of the effect is
unknown, education may also produce a sec-
ond-best externality through its positive effect
on a community’s tax base (Weisbrod 1964,
Hirsch and Marcus 1969, Holtmann 1971). An
increase in the average level of education gen-
erally raises the income of the community,
which (because housing is a normal good)
tends to lead to higher property values. High
levels of educational attainment appear to
attract firms (see, for example, Fox and Murray
1990, Bartik 1989, Carlton 1983), which also
positively affects property values. This external-
ity is a purely distributive one, rearranging the
business environment in the local best interest
at the expense of another, less attractive locale.
Furthermore, to the extent that communities tax
business property at a higher rate than residen-
tial property, attracting new businesses can
increase the tax base even if aggregate property
values remain unchanged. With a larger tax
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base, local governments can generate a given
level of tax revenues with lower tax rates.
Because the deadweight loss associated with
taxes generally falls as the marginal tax rate
falls, government activities can be less distor-
tionary in communities with higher tax bases.
The social safety net is the other major
source of second-best externalities from educa-
tion. Educated individuals are less likely to
receive welfare, Medicaid, or unemployment
compensation (McMahon 1987). They and their
children tend to be healthier (Grossman and
Kaestner 1997), which should reduce their use
of the public health system. Their children are
less likely to become teenage mothers, live in
poverty, or suffer from severe child abuse
(Maynard and McGrath 1997), all conditions that
are not only personal tragedies but also drains
on the public purse.
First-Best Externalities. Most of the first-
best externalities the literature examines are
related to productivity and economic growth.
Such externalities arise whenever education
enhances productivity or economic growth in a
way that is not reflected in the private returns to
education. Thus, whenever wages do not cap-
ture the full effects of a worker’s education, ex-
ternality benefits may arise. Similarly, if patents
do not fully capture the benefits of scientific or
technological discoveries and education fosters
such discoveries, part of the productivity gain
from technical change would also represent
externality benefits from education.
Rauch (1993) observes that if educational
externalities enhance worker productivity, “eco-
nomically identical workers will tend to earn
higher wages in human capital rich, rather than
human capital poor,” regions. Migration in
response to the higher wages will bid up rents
in such areas until worker utility is equalized
across the country. “Cities with higher average
levels of human capital should therefore have
higher wages and higher land rents” (Rauch
1993). Using data from the 1980 census to test
this hypothesis, Rauch finds that the average
level of education in a standard metropolitan
statistical area (SMSA) has a significant, positive
effect on both wages and rents.
6 His estimates
suggest that “each additional year of SMSA aver-
age education can be expected to raise total fac-
tor productivity by 2.8% with a standard error of
estimate of 0.8%.” The estimates also imply that
“the social return [to formal education] exceeds
the private return by a factor of…roughly 1.7.”
7
Rauch examines factor prices, but a num-
ber of other researchers examining factor quan-
tities have also found evidence suggesting that
there are first-best externalities from education.
For example, in analyzing the forty-eight con-
tiguous states, Wasylenko and McGuire (1985)
find that the level of educational attainment con-
tributes to employment growth, independent of its
effect on wages. Fox and Murray (1990) analyze
Tennessee counties and find that for a given
wage, the firm entry rate (number of new firms/
number of active firms) increases as the educa-
tional attainment of a county increases, imply-
ing that the educational attainment of a county
enhances firm productivity. Because all private
productivity benefits from education should be
internalized by the labor contract and be incor-
porated into the wage, these findings suggest
education may generate externality benefits.
The pattern of international capital flows
also suggests there may be education externali-
ties. Capital should flow to the countries where
it can earn the highest rates of return, which,
according to neoclassical growth theory, should
be the countries with the lowest capital–labor
ratios. However, we do not observe strong 
capital flows into poor countries with low capi-
tal–labor ratios. Although both discuss other
possible explanations, Lucas (1988, 1990) and
Gundlach (1994) explore the hypothesis that
externality benefits from human capital could
explain this discrepancy.
8 Examining data on
India and the United States and assuming that
the total stock of human capital grows at the
same rate as that part of the stock accumulated
through formal schooling, Lucas (1990) finds
that “taking the external effects of human capi-
tal into account…entirely eliminates the pre-
dicted return differential.” Gundlach (1994) finds
similar results for rate-of-return differentials be-
tween the United States and South Asia, Latin
America, and other Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development countries.
A number of other cross-country studies
also examine the important contribution human
capital makes to economic growth (for exam-
ple, see Engelbrecht 1997 and Benhabib and
Spiegel 1994 or the discussions in Carlino 1995,
Sala-i-Martin 1994, and Barro 1992). Unfortu-
nately, such cross-country evidence does not
build a persuasive case for externality benefits
from primary and secondary education. As
Levine and Renelt (1992) illustrate, the results of
cross-country growth models are disturbingly
fragile.
9 A number of models that do not incor-
porate human capital externalities also seem to
fit the cross-country data equally well (see, for
example, Benhabib and Jovanovic 1991 and the
discussion in Jorgenson 1998). The researchers
usually do not rule out the possibility that the18
growth benefits of human capital are fully pri-
vate. In addition, much of the recent literature
explicitly dealing with externality benefits
focuses on spillovers from research and devel-
opment or learning by doing, both of which
only loosely relate to primary and secondary
education. Furthermore, as Behrman and Ro-
senzweig (1994) discuss, international variations
in the completeness of the data and in the meas-
urement of enrollment and literacy can make
cross-country data on education very problem-
atic. Similarly, cross-country data on educational
attainment are problematic because they do not
control for potentially large differences in
school quality.
10 Finally, as noted education
researcher George Psacharopoulos (1996) put it
in discussing the use of cross-country data to
evaluate education externalities, “Beyond the
quality of such data, countries differ in many
other respects than the general level of educa-
tion of their labor force or population for the
desired effect to be credibly picked up in such
analysis.…Thus, the externality in question
might just be another name for our ignorance
on what really determines economic growth.”
Some have argued that in addition to its
apparent effects on growth, education might
also generate an externality by deterring crime
(for example, see Usher 1997 or Haveman and
Wolfe 1984). Unfortunately, as with analyses 
of cross-country growth, the empirical evidence
is unpersuasive. In her survey of the literature
on crime and education, Witte concludes that
“most crime is committed by young men dur-
ing their adolescent years” and that “neither
years of schooling completed nor receipt of a
high school degree has a significant effect on an
individual’s level of criminal activity. However,
greater amounts of time in school are associated
with lower levels of criminal activity” (Witte
1997, 233). Apparently, custodial supervision
reduces the opportunities to offend. Thus, the
evidence does not support the hypothesis of
externality benefits from primary and second-
ary education per se, but rather one of exter-
nality benefits from keeping teenagers off the
streets.
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ANALYSES OF THE DEMAND FOR EDUCATION
Analyses of the demand for education use
information about voting and expenditure pat-
terns to tease out information about the public’s
willingness to pay for education. The underly-
ing premise of all these studies is that house-
holds reveal their preferences for education
either by choosing to vote in a particular way or
by choosing to live in a place that offers a par-
ticular mix of taxes and educational services.
Of interest here are studies that differenti-
ate between private and social demands for
education. Such studies incorporate the premise
that households not directly benefiting from
educational spending would only be willing to
pay for it if school spending satisfies some
social objective. Because that social objective
could be either redistribution or the production
of externality benefits, a finding of significant
social demand for education can support either
of the two rationales for government interven-
tion in the education market.
In one such study, Wyckoff (1984) exam-
ines survey data about a referendum in
Michigan. Voters were asked to choose one of
six possible tax rates, each of which would sup-
port a different level of educational spending
per pupil. The survey contains information
about which of the six tax/expenditure levels
the voter preferred, the household’s tax price of
educational expenditures, whether the voter is
employed by the local school district, the num-
ber of children the household has in local pub-
lic schools, whether the voter believes increased
school spending affects school quality, and
other characteristics of the household. Wyckoff
hypothesizes that the preferences of households
with children in the local public schools reveal
information about private demand for educa-
tion, while the preferences of households with-
out such children reveal information about
social demand for education.
Like other researchers (for example, Ru-
binfeld and Shapiro 1989, Lankford 1985,
Rubinfeld 1977), Wyckoff finds evidence that
households with children in public schools
favor higher spending on education than house-
holds without such children. However, he also
demonstrates that, all else being equal, house-
holds without children in the local schools seem
willing to pay for public schooling. Evaluated at
the mean of all other characteristics, households
with no children in the schools were willing to
pay $1,222 per pupil, while otherwise equal
households with one child in school were will-
ing to pay $1,532 per pupil.
12 Wyckoff concludes
that at the margin, 9 percent of the benefits from
educational expenditures accrue to households
without children in school. However, he notes
that because his sample is small and the estima-
tion is imprecise, the social portion could be as
low as zero or as high as 50 percent.
Weisbrod (1962, 1964) originated a line of
analysis that uses expenditure, rather than vot-
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cation. He hypothesizes that any social benefits
of education accrue primarily to the community
in which the educated person lives. Although
Weisbrod does not put it in these terms, his
premise could also be seen as implying that
society feels altruistic only toward locals who
remain local. In either case, a community’s will-
ingness to pay for education should correlate
with expected migration patterns.
Everything else being equal, if a commu-
nity’s willingness to pay for schooling arises
from the expectation of social benefits, educa-
tional expenditures should follow a particular
pattern. Communities anticipating high emigra-
tion of locally educated individuals should be
less willing to pay for investment in education
because they are unable to capture externalities
produced by the education of those who subse-
quently move away; it is not rational to pay for
benefits not received. On the other hand, if edu-
cational expenditures attract new residents who
are already highly educated, then, all else equal,
communities that experience high immigration
of educated persons should be more willing to
pay for schooling. Finally, if school spending is
not a strong attraction for the educated, com-
munities that anticipate high immigration of
educated individuals should substitute this
“imported” human capital for the locally pro-
duced variety and be less willing to pay for
schooling.
Weisbrod (1964) constructs a simple linear
regression model that explains current educa-
tional expenditures at the state level (circa 1960)
by total personal income (both in per-pupil
terms); the percentage change in state popula-
tion from net immigration and net emigration
(separate variables); the fractions of expendi-
tures attributable to state and federal aid, re-
spectively; and by certain characteristics of the
student body.
13 He finds the state and federal aid
percentages insignificant at the 5 percent level
in explaining differences in educational expen-
ditures for the forty-eight contiguous states.
Personal income per pupil is a significant and
positive explanatory variable, as is the percent-
age of public school students in high school.
Weisbrod attributes the explanatory power of
the latter to the higher cost of teaching high
school students. Net migration has an asymmet-
ric effect on expenditures. While net immigra-
tion has no statistically significant effect, net
emigration has a significant, negative effect on
current expenditures. Although cautious about
reading too much into his results, Weisbrod
concludes that his analysis supports the case for
significant nonprivate benefits from education.
Subsequent tests of Weisbrod’s hypothesis
have yielded mixed results. Hadley (1985) up-
dates the analysis, excluding the intergovern-
mental aid and demographic variables and
measuring personal income per capita rather
than per pupil.
14 He confirms Weisbrod’s
hypothesis for the 1959–60 school year but
rejects it for the 1976–77 school year.
Greene (1977) and Holland (1974) observe
that local data are more appropriate than state-
level data for testing Weisbrod’s hypothesis.
Their results are also mixed. Using 1960 data
and treating state aid as endogenous (but, like
Hadley, excluding student demographics),
Holland finds no relationship between migra-
tion and per-pupil expenditures in Oklahoma
State Economic Areas. Using 1970 data and
including data on both intergovernmental aid
and student demographics, Greene finds that
expenditures by New York school districts posi-
tively correlate with immigration and negatively
correlate with emigration.
A common shortcoming of all these studies
is that they rely on migration data ill suited to
the analysis. The data do not differentiate the
emigration of those educated in the region from
the emigration of those educated elsewhere, nor
do they indicate the human capital endowments
of the migrants. Furthermore, none of these
analyses adjusts the emigration data for the
presence of parents with school-age children. A
search for school quality could lead parents to
migrate in direct response to the level of school
spending—attracted to communities with high
expenditures and repelled by communities with
low expenditures. Because this migration pat-
tern mimics the negative correlation between
expenditures and emigration expected under
Weisbrod’s hypothesis, data that include the
emigration of parents with school-age children
are biased in favor of the hypothesis and should
not be used to test it.
Another shortcoming these studies share is
that they treat emigration and immigration as
exogenous when they clearly are endogenous.
Research on migration and labor finds that the
number of years of schooling significantly and
positively correlates with the propensity to
migrate (Borsch-Supan 1990, Myers 1972, Schultz
1982). By extension, there should be a similar
correlation for educational quality. To the extent
that school quality is attributable to school
spending, local expenditures on education will
influence the future migration patterns of stu-
dents. At the very least, characteristics of the
local labor market that help determine a com-
munity’s ability to pay for schools also deter-20
mine the likelihood of migration for reasons of
employment.
Taylor (1992) refines these studies by
examining the relationship between migration
and educational expenditure when both emi-
gration and immigration are endogenous rather
than exogenous. Her analysis focuses on the
emigration of locally educated high school 
graduates who are unlikely to have school-age
children and the immigration of high school
graduates. She also incorporates an educational
production function to reflect efficiency differ-
ences in producing human capital. The analysis
is conducted across a subset of states, using
school-level data on expenditures and including
a wide variety of student demographics.
Taylor finds that the emigration of locally
educated individuals does not reduce local will-
ingness to pay for schools, but the immigration
of individuals already endowed with at least a
high school education does negatively influence
expenditures. This pattern implies that locally
produced and imported human capital are sub-
stitutes, and if a great deal of human capital
moves into an area, it may be unnecessary to
pay to produce it locally. Thus, while her analy-
sis of community spending patterns suggests
significant nonprivate benefits to education, it
also suggests that communities expect those
benefits to arise from adult migrants rather than
from locally educated children.
THE IMPLICATIONS
Considered individually, each piece of the
empirical evidence provides only modest sup-
port for the government’s role in primary and
secondary education. However, taken together,
the sheer volume of evidence is rather persua-
sive. Furthermore, any gaps in the empirical evi-
dence may indicate a complex measurement
problem—or a lack of research on the issue—
rather than the absence of significant social
benefits from education. Finally, there is little
doubt in economic circles that capital market
imperfections would lead to some degree of
underinvestment in education in the absence of
government intervention.
For the sake of argument (if nothing else),
assume a significant public interest in educa-
tion. What guidance do these underlying ration-
ales offer for government’s role in primary and
secondary education?
The first guiding principle is that families
should remain the primary educational decision
makers—and the primary educational financiers.
Unless taken to extremes that are unsupported
by empirical or theoretical evidence, all three
rationales give the government a subordinate role
in primary and secondary education. The market-
failure rationale implies that the government
should efficiently ensure families have access to
credit and that they pay no more for education
loans than they would for any other type of
investment loan. However, this rationale does
not imply education should be subsidized or the
government should determine the amount of
education students receive. The externalities
rationale implies education should be subsi-
dized, but it also implies the subsidy should be
proportional to the externality. Because the pri-
vate benefits from education greatly exceed the
nonprivate benefits,
15 families should pay the
lion’s share of educational expenses. (For a dis-
cussion of the U.S. family’s role in education
finance, see the box entitled “How Families Pay
for Elementary and Secondary Education.”) Fi-
nally, the altruism rationale implies that society
wishes to transfer resources to the young, but 
it does not imply that society cares more than
parents about the welfare of their children or
that society’s transfers to their children should
be large relative to the parents’ transfers.
One important consequence of this pri-
macy for parents is that parents retain control
over the level of educational spending. One-
size-fits-all financing, wherein society tries to
equalize expenditures or sets a very high floor
on spending per pupil, violates this principle.
Issuing an overly generous school voucher—or
any type of voucher that parents are not
allowed to supplement—would also violate this
principle.
The second guiding principle follows
directly from the notion that government has a
significant financial interest in primary and sec-
ondary education. To the extent that the gov-
ernment has money on the table, it also has a
legitimate interest in monitoring the outcomes
of the educational process. Thus, if the govern-
ment subsidizes education because education
generates positive externalities, it should ensure
schools behave in a way that produces such
externalities. For example, if the externalities
arise from the scientific literacy of the popula-
tion, the government should confirm that
schools promote scientific literacy. Similarly, if
the externalities that justify government subsi-
dies arise from socialization and the develop-
ment of common values, the government
should make eligibility for public funds contin-
gent on producing such outcomes. Even if the
government is only responding to market failure
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to monitor the use of its funds. Just as a prudent
private lender has an obligation to make sure
that car loans are used to buy cars, the govern-
ment has an obligation to ensure education
loans are used to buy education.
Monitoring educational outcomes does not
imply controlling the production process, how-
ever. The final guiding principle is that govern-
ment does not necessarily have a role in pro-
viding educational services or in regulating the
manner by which private schools provide edu-
cational services. The market-failure rationale is
silent on this issue, as is the altruism rationale.
Some economists have argued that public pro-
vision of education generates externality bene-
fits (such as socialization and the promotion of
democracy) that the public finance of education
alone cannot generate because public schools
provide a “common educational experience that
cannot be left to the vagaries of individual or
family choice.”
16 However, there is no empirical
evidence this effect outweighs the possible in-
efficiencies associated with the public provision
of education
17 or that private schools are less
cost-effective than public schools at generating
such effects. Furthermore, as West (1991) points
out, there is little commonality of practice
among public schools in the United States. If
providing a common educational experience
were the rationale for public provision of edu-
cation, we would expect more homogeneity in
the public school system. Absent significant
externalities that are uniquely generated by a
public school system, no economic rationale
requires the public provision of education.
CONCLUSIONS
Economic theory provides three broad
rationales that can warrant a role for govern-
ment in primary and secondary education, and
a substantial body of research provides em-
pirical support for these rationales. Some degree
of government participation in the education
market is clearly appropriate from an economic
perspective.
It is hard to justify the pervasive nature of
government participation in the current system,
however. On the basis of these rationales, gov-
ernment’s role in primary and secondary educa-
tion should be subordinate to the role of
families and primarily focused on assisting in
education finance and ensuring that schools
produce desirable social outcomes. Instead, we
have a long history of public provision of edu-
cation wherein the vast majority of school-age
children attend public schools, parents cannot
know the full extent of their responsibility for
education finance because the tax code assigns
that responsibility to an array of parties, and
pundits see no dissonance between pursuing
expanded subsidies for education and opposing
government plans to gather and disseminate
information about educational outcomes. Edu-
cation policy in the United States is apparently
about something other than economics.
NOTES
My thanks to Steve Brown, Jason Saving, and Alan
Viard for helpful comments and discussions. Of course,
all remaining errors are my own.
1 The data on educational expenditures are from
National Center for Education Statistics (1997, 1998).
2 Even if lenders could legally enforce long-term labor
contracts, there are substantial principal–agent prob-
lems associated with forcing people to use their
human capital.
3 “Some altruistic parents do not leave bequests
because they get less marginal utility from consump-
tion by their adult children than from their own con-
How Families Pay for Elementary and Secondary Education
Although the true extent of their burden is unknown, families pay for the educa-
tion provided by “free” public schools in a variety of ways.
The value of the time students bring to the classroom represents an enormous
share of our educational resources. At the high school level, between one-half and
two-thirds of U.S. school resources come from the students themselves in terms of
opportunity costs.
1
Another direct source of revenue from the family to the school is the school
taxes individuals pay on their residences. Whether they own or rent, residents usually
foot the bill for property taxes, although landlords may bear some portion of the tax
burden for rental property (Martinez-Vazquez and Sjoquist 1988, Roche 1986).
In addition, research suggests that homeowners are willing to pay a premium to
live in a neighborhood with good schools (Hayes and Taylor 1996, Black forthcom-
ing). Any such premium represents a payment for public schooling, whether or not
that payment is captured by the schools in the form of higher tax revenues.
Finally, families with children pay for schooling by picking up much of the school
tax burden that originates at the business level. Because capital must earn a compa-
rable after-tax rate of return in all parts of the world, taxes on business capital are
actually paid by the parents and the nonparents who work for the firm or buy its
products. Furthermore, landlords seldom bear the full burden of taxes on business
real estate. For example, Man (1995) finds that Phoenix property owners pay only 60
percent of the property taxes on commercial real estate while property users pay 40
percent. Similarly, McDonald (1993) finds that Chicago landlords pay only 55 percent
of property taxes on commercial real estate, while the remainder is passed through
to tenants in the form of higher rents. For the same reasons taxes on business capi-
tal are passed through to workers and customers, rent differentials resulting from
property taxes also tend to be passed through to workers and customers.
1 In 1996, average annual earnings were $15,478 for 18- to 24-year-old males with less than a
high school diploma who worked full time (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1997).Therefore, assum-
ing a nine-month school year, the opportunity cost of a year of school would be $11,609.
Alternatively, the minimum wage in 1996 was $4.75. Again assuming a nine-month school year
and full-time employment, the opportunity cost of a year of school would be $7,125. Average
expenditures on public elementary and secondary schooling for the 1996–97 school year were
$5,957 per pupil (U.S. Department of Education 1998).
Comparable calculations cannot be made at the grade-school level because child labor laws
make it impossible to observe potential wages for younger children and because very young
children are not only unemployable but also require costly supervision.22
sumption when elderly. They would like to raise their
own consumption at the expense of their children’s,
but they cannot do this if unable to leave debts to chil-
dren.…Selfish and weakly altruistic parents would like
to impose a large debt burden on their children.…
Parents who cannot leave debt can substitute their
own consumption for their children’s by investing less
in the children’s human capital and instead saving
more for old age. Therefore, in families without
bequests, the equilibrium marginal rate of return 
on investments in children must exceed the rate on
assets saved for old age; otherwise, parents would
reallocate some resources from children to savings.
These parents underinvest in their children” (Becker
and Murphy 1988, 5–6).
4 Because college students are overwhelmingly adults,
this argument does not apply to postsecondary edu-
cation.
5 Alternatively, de Bartolome (1988) argues that “in-
kind transfers may be a necessary instrument of redis-
tribution” when household wealth is unobservable: 
“A family ‘reveals’ its wealth by its choice of house size
and education level: redistribution may be effected by
linking tax policy to housing and educational choice.
Cash transfers alone cannot be used to effect redistri-
bution because all families appear alike.”
6 On the other hand, Maré (1995) demonstrates that
Rauch’s results can be sensitive to the inclusion or ex-
clusion of metropolitan areas, the choice of discount
rate, and the specification of metropolitan area charac-
teristics. His analysis also suggests that educational
externalities (if any) arise from postsecondary educa-
tion rather than from primary or secondary education.
7 In this context, the social return includes the private
return.
8 Other possible explanations include imperfections in the
market for physical capital and variations in political risk.
9 Levine and Renelt find that although the initial second-
ary-school enrollment rate enters their basic model of
growth in real, per-capita GDP with a significantly posi-
tive and robust coefficient, it is insignificant in models
with a richer set of explanatory variables (Levine and
Renelt 1992, 950).
10 For example, Behrman and Birdsall (1983) find that in
Brazil quality differences are as important as attain-
ment differences for understanding variations in earn-
ings and that analyses of attainment alone can be
misleading.
11 Donohue and Siegelman (1998) find evidence that pre-
school enrichment programs targeted to at-risk students
can cost-effectively reduce crime. Because “the avail-
able evidence does not demonstrate any delinquency-
reduction effect for Head Start” (a general enrichment
program for preschoolers), their results are unlikely to
extend to general primary and secondary education.
12 Wyckoff does not indicate whether the $1,222 is sig-
nificantly greater than the lower bound expenditure on
the survey of $825 per pupil. Twenty-seven percent of
survey respondents chose the minimum level of
expenditure.
13 The demographic variables are the percentage of the
school-age population in public schools, the percent-
age of public school students in high school, and the
percentage of public school students who are non-
white.
14 Hadley does not explain why he excludes the variables
on state and federal aid and student demographics.
While the aid variables are insignificant in Weisbrod’s
original estimation, the nonracial demographics are in-
dividually significant at the 5 percent or 10 percent level.
(Weisbrod does not report a test of joint significance.)
15 Even if one postulates that the benefits from education
arise primarily from signaling productivity to potential
employers rather than from the creation of human 
capital, the private benefits clearly outweigh the non-
private benefits of such signaling.
16 Levin 1991, 139.
17 For a discussion of such inefficiencies, see Grosskopf,
Hayes, Taylor, and Weber (1997).
REFERENCES
Barro, Robert J. (1992), “Human Capital and Economic
Growth,” unpublished manuscript (Harvard University).
Bartik, Timothy J. (1989), “Small Business Start-Ups in the
United States: Estimates of the Effects of Characteristics
of States,” Southern Economic Journal 55 (April): 1004–18.
Becker, Gary S., and Kevin M. Murphy (1988), “The
Family and the State,” Journal of Law and Economics
31 (April): 1–18.
Behrman, Jere R., and Nancy Birdsall (1983), “The
Quality of Schooling: Quantity Alone Is Misleading,”
American Economic Review 73 (December): 928–46.
Behrman, Jere R., and Mark R. Rosenzweig (1994),
“Caveat Emptor: Cross-Country Data on Education and
the Labor Force,” Journal of Development Economics 44
(June): 147–71.
Benhabib, Jess, and Boyan Jovanovic (1991), “Externali-
ties and Growth Accounting,” American Economic
Review 81 (March): 82–113.
Benhabib, Jess, and Mark M. Spiegel (1994), “The Role
of Human Capital in Economic Development: Evidence
from Aggregate Cross-Country Data,” Journal of
Monetary Economics 34 (October): 143–73.
Black, Sandra (forthcoming), “Do Better Schools Matter?
Parental Valuation of Elementary Education,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS       23 ECONOMIC REVIEW  FIRST QUARTER 1999
Borsch-Supan, A. (1990), “Education and its Double-
Edged Impact on Mobility,” Economics of Education
Review 9 (1): 39–53.
Carlino, Gerald A. (1995), “Do Education and Training
Lead to Faster Growth in Cities?” Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia Business Review, January–February, 15–22.
Carlton, Dennis W. (1983), “The Location and Employ-
ment Choices of New Firms: An Econometric Model with
Discrete and Continuous Endogenous Variables,” Review
of Economics and Statistics 65 (August): 440–49.
de Bartolome, Charles A. (1988), “Public Education as 
an Instrument of Redistribution,” C. V. Starr Center for
Applied Economics Economic Research Report no.
88-38 (New York, November).
Donohue, John J., and Peter Siegelman (1998), “Allocat-
ing Resources Among Prisons and Social Programs in
the Battle Against Crime,” Journal of Legal Studies 27
(January): 1–43.
Engelbrecht, Hans-Jürgen (1997), “International R&D
Spillovers, Human Capital and Productivity in OECD
Economies: An Empirical Investigation,” European
Economic Review 41 (August): 1479–88.
Fox, William F., and Matthew N. Murray (1990), “Local
Public Policies and Interregional Business Development,”
Southern Economic Journal 57 (October): 413–27.
Friedman, Milton, and Rose Friedman (1990), Free to
Choose: A Personal Statement (San Diego: Harcourt Brace).
Greene, Kenneth V. (1977), “Spillovers, Migration and
Public School Expenditures: The Repetition of an
Experiment,” Public Choice 29 (Spring): 85–93.
Grosskopf, Shawna, Kathy J. Hayes, Lori L. Taylor, and
William L. Weber (1997), “Budget-Constrained Frontier
Measures of Fiscal Equality and Efficiency in Schooling,”
Review of Economics and Statistics 79 (February):
116–24.
Grossman, Michael, and Robert Kaestner (1997), “Effects
of Education on Health,” in The Social Benefits of Educa-
tion, ed. Jere R. Behrman and Nevzer Stacey (Ann Arbor,
Mich.: University of Michigan Press), 69–124.
Gundlach, Erich (1994), “Accounting for the Stock of
Human Capital: Selected Evidence and Potential Implica-
tions,” Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 130 (2): 350–74.
Hadley, Garland R. (1985), “Interstate Migration, Income
and Public School Expenditures: An Update of an Experi-
ment,” Public Choice 46 (2): 207–14.
Haveman, Robert H., and Barbara L. Wolfe (1984),
“Schooling and Economic Well-Being: The Role of
Nonmarket Effects,” Journal of Human Resources 19
(Summer): 377–407.
Hayes, Kathy J., and Lori L. Taylor (1996), “Neighbor-
hood School Characteristics: What Signals Quality to
Homebuyers?” Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Economic
Review, Fourth Quarter, 2–9.
Hirsch, Werner Z., and Morton J. Marcus (1969), “Inter-
community Spillovers and the Provision of Public Educa-
tion,” Kyklos 22 (4): 641–60.
Holland, David W. (1974), “The Impact of Benefit Spill-
overs upon Economic Efficiency in Public School Finance,”
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 56 (May):
300–05.
Holtmann, A. G. (1971), “Migration to the Suburbs, Human
Capital and City Income Tax Losses: A Case Study,” in
Investment in Human Capital, ed. B. F. Kiker (Columbia,
S.C.: University of South Carolina Press), 590–600.
Hoxby, Caroline Minter (1996), “Are Efficiency and Equity
in School Finance Substitutes or Complements?” Journal
of Economic Perspectives 10 (Fall): 51–72.
Jorgenson, Dale W. (1998), “Investment and Growth”
(Paper presented at the Eighth International Conference,
“Monetary Policy in a World of Knowledge-based Growth,
Quality Change and Uncertain Measurement,” Institute
for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan,
Tokyo, June 18–19).
Lankford, R. Hamilton (1985), “Preferences of Citizens for
Public Expenditures on Elementary and Secondary
Education,” Journal of Econometrics 27 (January): 1–20.
Levin, Henry M. (1991), “The Economics of Educational
Choice,” Economics of Education Review 10 (2): 137–58.
Levine, Ross, and David Renelt (1992), “A Sensitivity
Analysis of Cross-Country Regressions,” American
Economic Review 82 (September ): 942–63.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. (1988), “On the Mechanics of
Economic Development,” Journal of Monetary Economics
22 (July): 3–42.
——— (1990), “Why Doesn’t Capital Flow from Rich to
Poor Countries?” American Economic Review 80 (May):
92–96.
Man, Joyce Y. (1995), “The Incidence of Differential
Commercial Property Taxes: Empirical Evidence,”
National Tax Journal 48 (December): 479–96.24
Maré, David C. (1995), “Living with Graduates: Human
Capital Interactions in Metropolitan Areas,” unpublished
manuscript (Harvard University).
Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge, and David L. Sjoquist (1988),
“Property Tax Financing, Renting and the Level of Local
Expenditures,” Southern Economic Journal 55 (October):
424–31.
Maynard, Rebecca A., and Daniel J. McGrath (1997),
“Family Structure, Fertility and Child Welfare,” in The
Social Benefits of Education, ed. Jere R. Behrman and
Nevzer Stacey (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan
Press),125–74.
McDonald, John F. (1993), “Incidence of the Property 
Tax on Commercial Real Estate: The Case of Downtown
Chicago,” National Tax Journal 46 (June): 109–20.
McMahon, W. W. (1987), “Externalities in Education,” in
Economics of Education Research and Studies, ed. George
Psacharopoulos (Oxford: Pergamon Press), 133–37.
Myers, R. G. (1972), Education and Emigration: Study
Abroad and the Migration of Human Resources (New
York: David McKay Company).
National Center for Education Statistics (1996), Digest of
Education Statistics 1996 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office).
——— (1997, 1998), The Condition of Education (Wash-
ington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office).
Poterba, James M. (1996), “Government Intervention in
the Markets for Education and Health Care: How and
Why?” in Individual and Social Responsibility: Child Care,
Education, Medical Care and Long-Term Care, ed. Victor
R. Fuchs (Chicago: Chicago University Press), 277–304.
Psacharopoulos, George (1996), “Economics of Educa-
tion: A Research Agenda,” Economics of Education
Review 15 (October): 339–44.
Rauch, James E. (1993), “Productivity Gains from
Geographic Concentration of Human Capital: Evidence
from the Cities,” Journal of Urban Economics 34
(November): 380–400.
Roche, Ellen (1986), “Property Taxation in Local Finance:
Differences in the Tax Price Between Renters and Owner
Occupants,” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland,
College Park).
Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1977), “Voting in a Local School
Election: A Micro Analysis,” Review of Economics and
Statistics 59 (February): 30–42.
Rubinfeld, Daniel L., and Perry Shapiro (1989), “Micro-
estimation of the Demand for Schooling,” Regional
Science and Urban Economics 19 (August): 381–98.
Sala-i-Martin, Xavier (1994), “Cross-Sectional Regres-
sions and the Empirics of Economic Growth,” European
Economic Review 38 (April): 739–47.
Schultz, T. P. (1982), “Notes of the Estimation of Migra-
tions Decision Functions,” in Migration and the Labor
Market in Developing Countries, ed. R. H. Sabot (Boulder,
Colo.: Westview Press), 91–126.
Taylor, Lori L. (1992), “Student Emigration and the
Willingness to Pay for Public Schools: A Test of the
Publicness of Public High Schools in the U.S.,” Public
Finance/Finances Publiques 47 (1): 131–52.
U.S. Bureau of the Census (1997), Money Income in the
United States: 1996, Current Population Reports, Series
P60-1970 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office).
U.S. Department of Education (1998), Public Elementary
and Secondary Education Statistics: School Year 1997–98
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office).
Usher, Dan (1997), “Education as a Deterrent to Crime,”
Canadian Journal of Economics 30 (May): 367–84.
Wasylenko, M., and T. McGuire (1985), “Jobs and Taxes:
The Effect of Business Climate on States’ Unemployment
Growth Rates,” National Tax Journal 38 (December):
497–511.
Weisbrod, Burton A. (1962), “Education and Investment
in Human Capital,” Journal of Political Economy 70
(Supplement, pt. 2): 106–23.
——— (1964), “External Benefits of Public Education: 
An Economic Analysis,” Princeton University Economics
Department, Industrial Relations Section Research
Report no. 105 (Princeton, N.J.).
West, Edwin G. (1991), “Public Schools and Excess
Burdens,” Economics of Education Review 10 (2):
159–69.
Witte, Ann Dryden (1997), “Crime” in The Social Benefits
of Education, ed. Jere R. Behrman and Nevzer Stacey
(Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press).
Wyckoff, James H. (1984), “The Nonexcludable Public-
ness of Primary and Secondary Public Education,”
Journal of Public Economics 24 (August): 331–51.